ScopeHunter

Build log

What we shipped, what it found, and what we got wrong. ScopeHunter's compliance automation is built against our own production infrastructure first — so this log includes the parts that didn't work.

Updated 19 August 2026 · currently on release 2026.8.44

Most compliance tooling shows you a number. The interesting question is whether the number is earned. Everything below was run against real hosts before it was written about, and where a control turned out not to work, that is recorded here rather than quietly fixed.

Recently shipped

A fleet no longer needs a UUID per machine 19 Aug

2026.8.43 — inventory inbox

Reporting per-check evidence used to require pinning a system UUID into each machine's config. For a 200-host estate that is 200 hand-maintained values and 200 chances to point two machines at the same record. Machines now identify themselves by their own name; anything the platform doesn't recognise is held rather than rejected, and an admin claims it once. Every later report routes itself.

The hardening formula is served from the platform 19 Aug

2026.8.43 / 2026.8.44 — formula distribution

Customers fetch a pinned, checksum-verified release over an authenticated endpoint instead of cloning a repository. Publishing is a deliberate release act with no upload path reachable over HTTP — production can read the artifact bucket and cannot write to it, because the artifact is software that runs as root on someone else's servers.

Reporting works through a Salt master, so machines need no outbound access 19 Aug

cmmc-lockdown-formula 2026.8.2

Inside a controlled boundary the machines usually cannot reach the internet at all. The master already talks to every machine and is already the host permitted out, so it now collects and reports on the fleet's behalf — one outbound connection instead of one per host. Validated on a real master with a genuinely egress-restricted minion, and the masterless path was re-proven afterwards rather than assumed.

What broke, and what we changed because of it

A green test suite that tested none of the new code

Our security suite passed against a release it did not cover. Green that means less than it looks is worse than red, because it gets trusted. We now verify every new control by deliberately breaking it and confirming the suite fails — and added fuzz testing, because the defects that got through were all cases nobody had thought to assert.

Three ways evidence could be silently lost

An external review of our own changes found three paths where a machine's report could be accepted and then quietly dropped. All three were the same failure wearing different clothes, in code written specifically to prevent it. Fixed, each with a regression test, and a database constraint now enforces an invariant that had previously been maintained only by a comment.

Real-time malware scanning that didn't scan

On-access scanning was implemented, applied cleanly, reported itself as running — and detected nothing. It is currently disabled and recorded as not working, rather than counted as a satisfied control. A control that reports success without doing its job is worse than an obvious gap.

Where the score comes from

Our own production host publishes its posture through the same pipeline customers use. See the feature status page for what is live versus still incubating, and the CMMC automation write-up for how the hardening is actually tested.

Get started on ScopeHunter → Preview the compliance workspace Want help implementing it? Talk to L-IT

ScopeHunter is built and operated by L-IT Technical Solutions, a Texas IT consultancy — the same people who run this automation against their own production infrastructure.